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ABSTRACT
Global climate change poses a threat to the well-being of humans and other living things through
impacts on ecosystem functioning, biodiversity, capital productivity, and human health. This paper
briefly surveys recent research on the economics of climate change, including theoretical insights
and empirical findings that offer guidance to policy makers. Section 1 frames the climate change
problem  and  indicates  the  ways  that  economic  research  can  address  it.  Section  2  describes
approaches to measuring the benefits and costs associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In Section 3 we discuss the implications of uncertainty for the timing and stringency of policies to
address  possible  climate  change.  We  then  present  issues  related  to  policy  design,  including
instrument choice (Section 4), flexibility (Section 5), and international coordination (Section 6). The
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
  The prospect of global climate change has emerged as a major scientific and public 
policy issue.  Scientific studies indicate that accumulated carbon dioxide emitted from the 
burning of fossil fuels, along with contributions from other human-induced greenhouse gas 
emissions, are leading to warmer surface temperatures.  Possible current-century 
consequences of this temperature increase include increased frequency of extreme 
temperature events (such as heat waves), heightened storm intensity, altered precipitation 
patterns, sea level rise, and reversal of ocean currents.  These changes, in turn, can have 
significant impacts on the functioning of ecosystems, the viability of wildlife, and the well-
being of humans. 
 
  There is considerable disagreement within and among nations as to what policies, if 
any, should be introduced to mitigate and perhaps prevent climate change and its various 
impacts.  Despite the disagreements, in recent years we have witnessed the gradual 
emergence of a range of international and domestic climate-change policies, including 
emissions trading programs, emissions taxes, performance standards, and technology-
promoting programs. 
 
  Beginning with William Nordhaus’s (1982) “How Fast Shall We Graze the Global 
Commons?” climate-change economics has focused on diagnosing the economic 
underpinnings of climate change and offering positive and normative analyses of policies to 
confront the problem.  While overlapping with other areas of environmental economics, it 
has a unique focus because of distinctive features of the climate problem – including the long 
time-scale, the extent and nature of uncertainties, the international scope of the issue, and the 
uneven distribution of policy benefits and costs across space and time.   
 
In our discussion of the economics of climate change, we begin with a brief account 
of alternative economic approaches to measuring the benefits and costs associated with  
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2.  Assessing the Benefits and Costs of Climate Change Mitigation 
 
 
a.  Climate change damages and mitigation benefits 
 
  As noted, the potential consequences of climate change include increased average 
temperatures, greater frequency of extreme temperature events, altered precipitation patterns, 
and sea level rise.  These biophysical changes affect human welfare.  While the distinction is 
imperfect, economists divide the (often negative) welfare impacts into two main categories:  
market and non-market damages.   
 
 Market  damages.  As the name suggests, market damages are the welfare impacts 
stemming from changes in prices or quantities of marketed goods.  Changes in productivity 
typically underlie these impacts.   Often researchers have employed climate-dependent 
production functions to model these changes, specifying wheat production, for example, as a 
function of climate variables such as temperature and precipitation.  In addition to 
agriculture, this approach has been applied in other industries including forestry, energy 
services, water utilities and coastal flooding from sea-level rise (see, for example, Smith and 
Tirpak 1989; Yohe et al. 1996; Mansur et al. 2005).  
 
  The production function approach tends to ignore possibilities for substitution across 
products, which motivates an alternative, hedonic approach (see, for example, Mendelsohn et 
al. 1994, and Schlenker et al. forthcoming;).  Applied to agriculture, the hedonic approach 
aims to embrace a wider range of substitution options, employing cross-section data to 
examine how geographical, physical, and climate variables are related to the prices of 
agricultural land.  Assuming that crops are chosen to maximize rents, that rents reflect the 
productivity of a given plot of land relative to that of marginal land, and that land prices are 
the present value of land rents, the impact of climate variables on land prices is an indicator 
of their impact on productivity after allowing for crop-substitution.   
 
  Non-market damages.  Non-market damages include the direct utility loss stemming 
from a less hospitable climate, as well as welfare costs attributable to lost ecosystem services 
or lost biodiversity.  For these damages, revealed-preference methods face major challenges 
here because non-market impacts may not leave a  “behavioral trail” of induced changes in 
prices or quantities that can used to determine welfare changes.  The loss of biodiversity, for 
example, does not have any obvious connection with price changes or observable demands.  
Partly because of the difficulties of revealed-preference approaches in this context, 
researchers often employ stated-preference or interview techniques – most notably the 
contingent valuation method – to assess the willingness to pay to avoid non-market damages.  
(See, for example, Smith 2004.)  
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b.  Cost assessment 
 
  The costs of avoiding emissions of carbon dioxide, the principal greenhouse gas, 
depend on substitution possibilities on several margins:  the ability to substitute across 
different fuels (which release different amounts of carbon dioxide per unit of energy), to 
substitute away from energy in general in production, and to shift away from energy-
intensive goods.  The greater the potential for substitution, the lower the costs of meeting a 
given emissions-reduction target. 
 
  Applied models have taken two main approaches to assessing substitution options and 
costs.  One approach employs “bottom-up” energy technology models with considerable 
detail on the technologies of specific energy processes or products (for example, Barretto and 
Kypreos 2004).  The models tend to concentrate on one sector or a small group of sectors and 
offer less information on abilities to substitute from energy in general, or on how changes in 
the prices of energy-intensive goods affect intermediate and final demands for those goods. 
 
  The other approach employs “top down” economy-wide models, which include but 
are not limited computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (see, for example, Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen 1996; and Conrad 2002).  An attraction of these models is their ability to trace 
relationships between fuel costs, production methods, and consumer choices throughout the 
economy in an internally consistent way.  However, they tend to include much less detail on 
specific energy processes or products.  Substitution across fuels is generally captured through 
smooth production functions, rather than through explicit attention to alternative discrete 
processes.  In recent years, attempts have been made to reduce the gap between the two types 
of models.  Bottom-up models have gained scope, and top-down models have incorporated 
greater detail.  (See, for example, McFarland et al. 2004.)  
 
  Because climate depends on the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases, and because 
for most gases the residence times in the atmosphere are hundreds (and in some cases, 
thousands) of years, climate change is an inherently long-term problem and assumptions 
about technological change are particularly important.  The modeling of technological 
change has advanced significantly beyond the early tradition that treated technological 
change as exogenous.  Several recent models allow the rate or direction of technological 
progress to respond endogenously to policy interventions.  Some models focus on R&D-
based technological change, incorporating connections between policy interventions, 
incentives to research and development, and advances in knowledge.  (See, for example, 
Goulder and Schneider (1999), Nordhaus (2002), Buonanno et al. (2003), and Popp (2004).)  
Others emphasize learning-by-doing-based technological change where production cost falls 
with cumulative output, in keeping with the idea that cumulative output is associated with 
learning  (for example, Manne and Richels (2004)).  Allowing for policy-induced 
technological change tends to yield lower (and sometimes significantly lower) assessments of 
the costs of reaching given emissions-reduction targets relative to models in which 






c.  Integrated assessment     
 
  While the cost models described above are useful for evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of alternative policies to achieve a given emissions target, the desire to relate 
costs to mitigation benefits (avoided damages) has spawned the development of integrated 
assessment models.  These models link greenhouse gas emissions, greenhouse gas 
concentrations, and changes in temperature or precipitation, and they consider how these 
changes feed back on production and utility.  Many of the integrated assessment models are 
optimization models that solve for the emissions time-path that maximizes net benefits, in 
some cases under constraints on temperature or concentration (see, for example, Nordhaus 




3.  Dealing with Uncertainty 
 
 
  The uncertainties about both the costs and benefits from reduced climate change are 
vast.  In a recent meta-analysis examining 28 studies’ estimated benefits from reduced 
climate change (Tol 2005), the 90-percent confidence interval for the benefit estimates 
ranged from -$10 to +$350 per ton of carbon, with a mode of $1.50 per ton.  On the cost side, 
a separate study found marginal costs of between $10 and $212 per ton of carbon for a 10 
percent reduction in 2010 (Weyant and Hill 1999).   
 
 
a.  Uncertainty and the stringency of climate policy 
  
  Increasingly sophisticated numerical models have attempted to deal explicitly with 
these substantial uncertainties regarding costs and benefits.  Some provide an uncertainty 
analysis using Monte Carlo approaches, providing either a range of consequences for a given 
policy or a range of optimal policies.  Others explicitly optimize over uncertain outcomes, 
typically finding justification for a more aggressive climate policy than would emerge from a 
deterministic analysis.  Nordhaus (1994) employs an integrated climate-economy model to 
compare the optimal carbon tax in a framework with uncertain parameter values with the 
optimal tax when parameters are set at their central values.  In this application, an uncertainty 
premium arises:  the optimal tax is more than twice as high in the former case than in the 
latter, and the optimal amount of abatement is correspondingly much greater.  The higher 
optimal tax could in principle be due to uncertainty about any parameter whose relationship 
with damages is convex, thus yielding large downside risks relative to upside risks.  In the 
Nordhaus model, the higher optimal tax stems primarily from uncertainty about the discount 
rate (Pizer 1999). 
 
 
b.  The choice of discount rate under uncertainty 
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  The importance of the discount rate arises because greenhouse gases persist in the 
atmosphere for a century or more, and therefore mitigation benefits must be measured on 
dramatically different time-scales from those of ordinary environmental problems.  A 
prescriptive approach links the discount rate to subjective judgments about intergenerational 
equity as indicated by a pure social rate of time-preference (see, for example, Arrow et al. 
1996).  A descriptive approach relates the discount rate to future market interest rates.  Under 
both approaches, significant uncertainties surround the discount rates.  Recent work by 
Weitzman (1998) points out that a rate lower than the expected value should be employed in 
the presence of such uncertainty, a reflection of the relationships among the discount factor, 
the discount rate, and the time-interval over which discounting applies.  Put simply, the 
discount factor e
-rt is an increasingly convex function of the interest rate r as the period of 
discounting t increases.  This implies that in the presence of uncertainty the certainty-
equivalent discount rate is lower than the expected value of the discount rate:  that is, 
ln(E[e
-rt])/t < E[r].  The difference between the appropriate, certainty-equivalent rate and the 
expected value of the discount rate widens the longer is the time horizon.  While Weitzman 
focuses on a single uncertain rate, Newell and Pizer (2003a) show that under reasonable 
specifications of uncertainty about the evolution of future market rates, this approach doubles 
the expected marginal benefits from future climate change mitigation compared with the 
estimated benefits from an analysis that uses only the current rate. 
 
 
c.  Act today or wait for better information?   
 
  In addition to concerns about convexity and valuation, uncertainty raises important 
questions about whether and how much to embark on mitigation activities now versus 
waiting until at least some uncertainty is resolved.  Economic theory suggests that in the 
absence of fixed costs and irreversibilities, society should mitigate (today) to the point where 
expected marginal costs and benefits are equal.  Yet climate change inherently involves fixed 
costs and irreversible decisions both on the cost side, in terms of investments in carbon-free 
technologies, and on the benefit side, in terms of accumulated emissions.  These features can 
lead to more intensive action, or to inaction, depending on the magnitude of their respective 
sunk values (Pindyck 2000).  Despite the ambiguous theory, empirically calibrated analytical 
and numerical models tend to recommend initiating reductions in emissions in the present, 
reflecting initially negligible marginal cost and non-negligible environmental benefits 




4.  The Choice of Instrument for Climate-Change Policy 
 
 
  Policy makers can consider a range of potential instruments for promoting reductions 
in emissions of greenhouse gases.  Alternatives include emissions taxes, abatement subsidies, 
emissions quotas, tradable emissions allowances, and performance standards.  Policy makers 
also can choose whether to apply a given instrument to emissions directly (as with an 
emissions trading program) or instead to pollution-related goods or services (as with a fuel 
tax or technology subsidy).  
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  Initial economic analyses of climate-change policy tended to focus on a carbon tax 
because it was relatively easy to model and implement.  This is a tax on fossil fuels – oil, 
coal, and natural gas – in proportion to the carbon content of the fuels.  Because combustion 
of fossil fuels or their refined fuel products leads to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
proportional to carbon content, a carbon tax is effectively a tax on CO2 emissions.  In the 
simplest analysis, a carbon tax set equal to the marginal climate-related damage from carbon 
combustion would be efficiency-maximizing.  However, in more complex analyses – where 
additional dimensions such as uncertainty, other market failures, and distributional impacts 
are taken into account – the superiority of such a carbon tax is no longer assured.  We now 
consider these other dimensions and their implications for instrument choice. 
 
 
a.  Prices (taxes) vs. quantities (tradable allowances) in the presence of uncertainty 
 
  Theoretical and empirical work by Kolstad (1996) and Newell and Pizer (2003b) 
suggests that the marginal benefit (avoided damage) schedule for emissions reductions is 
relatively flat.  Weitzman’s (1974) seminal analysis indicates that under these circumstances, 
expected welfare losses are smaller when a price-based instrument like a carbon tax is 
employed, as opposed to a quantity-based instrument like emissions quotas or a system of 
tradable emissions allowances.  That is, it is preferable to let levels of emissions remain 
uncertain (which is the result under a tax) than to let the marginal price of emissions-
reductions remain uncertain (which is the result under a quota).  Despite these economic 
welfare arguments, and recent work on hybrid approaches (Pizer 2002), many environmental 
advocates prefer the quantity-based approach precisely because it removes uncertainty about 
the level of emissions. 
 
 
b. Fiscal impacts and instrument choice 
 
  A second issue stems from interactions with the tax system and the potential for 
policies such as carbon taxes and auctioned permits to generate revenues.  A number of 
studies show that using such revenues to finance reductions in pre-existing distortionary 
taxes on income, sales, or payroll can achieve given environmental targets at lower cost – 
perhaps substantially lower cost – than other policies (see, for example, Goulder et al. 1999, 
Parry et al. 1999, and Parry and Oates 2000).  Therefore, carbon taxes and auctioned permit 
programs that employ their revenues this way will lower the excess burden from prior taxes, 
giving them a significant cost-advantage.  Correspondingly, subsidies to emissions-
reductions or to new, “clean” technologies will have a cost-disadvantage associated with the 
need to raise distortionary taxes to finance these policies. 
 
 
c.  Distributional considerations 
  
  Despite these attractions of revenue-raising policies such as carbon taxes and 
auctioned tradable allowance systems, trading programs with freely distributed permits have 
gained more popularity among policy makers.  For example, while the United Kingdom had,  
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and New Zealand has planned, a carbon tax (both with exceptions for heavy industry), the 
European Union and Canada have or have planned trading programs where tradable permits 
are freely distributed, in line with virtually all conventional pollution trading programs in the 
United States.   
 
The politics may reflect different regulatory burdens under a system of freely 
allocated allowances, as compared with a system with auctioned allowances.  Under both 
types of emissions permit system, profit-maximizing firms will find it in their interest to raise 
output prices based on the new, non-zero cost associated with carbon emissions.  If the 
allowances are given out free, firms can retain rents associated with the higher output prices, 
and this offsets other compliance costs.  In contrast, if the allowances are auctioned, firms do 
not capture these rents.  Thus, firms bear a considerably smaller share of the regulatory 
burden in the case of freely allocated permits.  Indeed, Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) show 
that freely allocating all carbon permits to U.S. fossil fuel suppliers generally will cause those 
firms to enjoy higher profits than in the absence of a permit system; and freely allocating less 
than a fifth of the permits may be sufficient to keep profits from falling.  These 
considerations reveal a potential trade-off between efficiency and political feasibility:  the 
revenue-raising policies (taxes and auctioned permits) are the most cost-effective, while the 
non-revenue-raising policies (freely-distributed permits) have distributional consequences 
that may reduce  political resistance.  
 
 
d.  Emissions instruments vs. technology instruments 
 
  As noted in the cost discussion, the long-term nature of the climate-change problem 
makes technological change a central issue in policy considerations.  Economic analysis 
suggests that both “direct emissions policies” and “technology-push policies” are justified on 
efficiency grounds to correct two distinct market failures.  Direct emissions policies 
(emissions trading or taxes) gain support from the fact that combustion of fossil fuels and by 
other greenhouse-gas-producing activities generate negative externalities in the form of 
climate-change-related damages.   Technology-push policies (technology and R&D 
incentives) gain support from the fact that not all of the social benefits from the invention of 
a new technology can be appropriated by the inventor.  The latter argument applies to 
research and development more generally, and is especially salient if the first market-failure 
is not fully corrected (Fischer 2004a).  Numerical assessments reveal substantial cost-savings 





5.  Policy Designs to Enhance Flexibility 
 
  The previous discussion indicates that no single instrument is best along all important 
policy dimensions, including cost uncertainty, fiscal interactions, distribution, and 
technology development.  A further issue in policy choice is how to give regulated firms or 
nations the flexibility to seek out mitigation opportunities wherever and whenever they are 
cheapest.  For both price- and quantity-based policies, flexibility is enhanced through broad  
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coverage:  specifically, by including as many emissions sources in the program as possible 
and by providing opportunities for regulated sources to offset their obligations through 
relevant activities outside the program.  For quantity-based programs, flexibility can also be 
promoted through provisions allowing trading of allowances across gases, time, and national 
boundaries.  Such flexibility is automatically provided by price-based programs simply 
because they involve no quantitative emissions limits.  Importantly, as quantity-based 
programs provide these additional dimensions of flexibility, they reduce the efficiency 
arguments for price-based policies in the face of uncertainty voiced in the preceding section 
by providing opportunities to adjust to idiosyncratic cost shocks across time, space, and 
industry (Jacoby and Ellerman 2004). 
 
 
a  Flexibility over gases and sequestration 
 
  So far we have focused almost exclusively on emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
burning of fossil fuels as both the cause of human-induced climate change and the object of 
any mitigation policy.  Yet emissions of a number of other gases (as well as non-energy 
related emissions of carbon dioxide) contribute to the problem and possibly the solution, 
particularly in the short run.  Models suggest that half of the reductions achievable at costs of 
$5-10 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent arise from gases other than carbon dioxide.  In 
addition, carbon sequestration can be part of the solution.  Biological sequestration (e.g., 
through afforestation) has been cited as a particularly inexpensive response to climate change 
(Sedjo 1995; Richards and Stavins 2005).  Geological sequestration (e.g., injection into 
depleted oil or gas reservoirs) represents a very expensive proposition now, but could be an 
important component of a long-term policy solution if costs decline (Newell and Anderson 
2004). 
 
  Four issues can complicate the inclusion of these activities: monitoring, baselines, 
comparability, and, in some cases, liability.   First, some of these sources are fugitive 
emissions that are difficult to monitor at any point in the product cycle.  Second, some 
activities, especially those involving fugitive emissions, are often left unregulated but 
allowed to enter as “offsets,” requiring a counterfactual baseline against which actual 
emissions levels can be measured.  Fischer (2004b) evaluates various approaches to defining 
project baselines. 
 
  Third, a problem of comparability arises with non-CO2 gases because it is necessary 
to determine relative prices among greenhouse gases in a market-based program.  As a 
theoretical matter, the relative price between a ton of current emissions of two gases should 
be the ratio of the present value of damages from these emissions (Schmalensee 1993).  In 
practice, it is difficult to apply this formula because it requires a great deal of information 
about the damages and because it calls for time-varying trading ratios (Reilly et al. 2001), 
which implies significant administrative burdens.  Under the Kyoto Protocol and the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme, one set of trading ratios is used at all times, and the ratios are 
calculated by determining the ratio of warming impacts over a 100-year horizon beginning 
with the present time. 
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  Finally, a liability issue arises with regard to sequestration.  For both biologically and 
geologically sequestered carbon, a key question is who should be held liable for carbon 
dioxide that is released accidentally or otherwise. 
 
 
b.  Flexibility over time 
 
  While price policies naturally allow emissions to rise and fall in response to shocks 
over time, quantity-based policies must explicitly address the question of whether regulated 
sources can bank unused allowances for future use or, in some cases, borrow them from 
future allocations.  In the climate change context, merely shifting emissions across time, 
versus allowing accumulated emissions to vary, holds the environment harmless because 
climate consequences are generally due to accumulated concentrations, not annual emissions 
(Roughgarden and Schneider 1999, discuss the possibility of dependence on both 
accumulated concentrations and the rate of accumulation).  Such shifts across time might 
reflect either a more efficient choice of timing in response to capital turnover and 
technological progress (Wigley et al. 1996), or an attempt to ameliorate cost-shocks 
(Williams 2002; Jacoby and Ellerman 2004).  The rate of exchange between present and 
future emissions allowances need not be unity:  Kling and Rubin (1997) show that the 
optimal rate at which banked allowances translate across periods should reflect the expected 
trend in marginal mitigation benefits, the interest rate, and decay rate of the accumulated gas. 
 
 
c. Flexibility over location 
 
  The defining feature of the climate-change problem may be its intrinsically global 
nature.  Greenhouse gases tend to disperse themselves uniformly around the globe.  As a 
result, the climate consequences of a ton of emissions of a given greenhouse gas do not 
depend on the location of the source, either within or across national borders, and shifts in 
emissions across locations do not change global climate impacts.  Under these circumstances, 
economic efficiency calls for making market-based systems as geographically broad as 
possible.  It supports federal over regional policies, and international coordination over 




6.  International Policy Initiatives and Coordination 
 
 
  International coordination is both crucial and exceptionally difficult to achieve.  
Studies indicate that the economic and social impacts of climate change would be distributed 
very unevenly across the globe, with the prospect of large damages to several nations in the 
tropics coupled with the potential for benefits to some countries in the temperate zones (see, 
for example, Tol 2005 and Mendelsohn 2003).  This uneven distribution makes achieving 
international coordination especially difficult. 
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  The Kyoto Protocol is the first significant international effort to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.  It assigns emissions limits to participating industrialized countries for 2008-
2012, but offers flexibility in allowing these countries to alter their limits by buying or selling 
emissions allowances from other industrialized countries or by investing in projects that lead 
to emissions-reductions in developing countries.  The importance of these flexibility 
mechanisms for dramatically lowering compliance costs in this international setting is well 
documented (Weyant and Hill 1999). 
 
The Protocol has been criticized on the grounds that it imposes overly stringent 
emissions-reduction targets and lacks a longer-term vision for action.  In addition, a core 
feature of the Protocol—legally-binding emissions limits—has been challenged on the 
grounds that such limits are not self-enforcing, an arguably necessary attribute in a world of 
sovereign nations (Barrett 2003).  Some argue that the Protocol’s project-based mechanisms 
for encouraging (but not requiring) emissions-reductions in developing countries are highly 
bureaucratic and cumbersome, consistent with our earlier comments about project-based 
programs more generally.  These criticisms have led to considerable research considering the 
Kyoto structure and comparing it with various alternative international approaches.  Aldy et 
al. (2003) summarize more than a dozen alternatives, which include an international carbon 
tax and international technology standards. 
 
A further major criticism is that the Protocol imposes no mandatory emissions limits 
on developing countries, which collectively are expected to match industrialized countries in 
emissions of greenhouse gases by 2035.  The desire to promote greater participation by 
developing countries, and well as to involve the United States in the international effort, has 
motivated considerable research examining, within a game-theoretic framework, the 
requirements for broader participation and for stable international coalitions.   (See, for 




7.  Conclusions 
 
 
  Climate-change economics has produced new methods for evaluating environmental 
benefits, for determining costs in the presence of various market distortions or imperfections, 
for making policy choices under uncertainty, and for allowing flexibility in policy responses.   
Although major uncertainties remain, it has helped generate important guidelines for policy 
choice that remain valid under a wide range of potential empirical conditions.  It has also 
helped focus empirical work by making clear where better information about key parameters 
would be most valuable. 
 
  Clearly, many theoretical and empirical questions remain unanswered.  We suggest 
(with some subjectivity) that there is a particularly strong need for advances in the integration 
of emissions policy and technology policy, in defining baselines that determine the extent of 
offset activities outside a regulated system, and in fostering international cooperation. 
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 From 2003 until 2030, the world is poised to invest an estimated $16 trillion in 
energy infrastructure, with annual carbon dioxide emissions estimated to rise by 60 percent.  
How well economists answer important remaining questions about climate change could 
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